Case Study of the  Egyptian Revolution by Cirillo, Chelsea
Susquehanna University Political Review 
Volume 11 Article 2 
4-2020 
Case Study of the Egyptian Revolution 
Chelsea Cirillo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.susqu.edu/supr 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cirillo, Chelsea (2020) "Case Study of the Egyptian Revolution," Susquehanna University Political Review: 
Vol. 11 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.susqu.edu/supr/vol11/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Susquehanna University Political Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, 
please contact sieczkiewicz@susqu.edu. 
11th Edition
43




Many political scientists argue that 
anocracies, or semi-democracies, are more prone to 
political violence than countries that are either 
strictly democratic or strictly authoritarian 
(Vreeland 2003, 401). An anocracy is defined as, “a 
type of regime that mixes democratic with 
autocratic features.” To test this theory, I will study 
the governmental system of Egypt, a country that 
has long been deemed a semi-democratic nation. 
Egypt has a score of -4 on the Polity Data Series, 
which ranges from -10 to 10, and is titled a “closed 
anocracy” (Polity IV). I will examine the 
governmental history of Egypt. I will particularly 
look at civil war and revolution within the 
government, and the history of violence as it has 
risen and fallen with levels of popular sovereignty. 
Lessons that can be learned from a study of this sort 
is the need for a strong, centralized government in a 
state. 
Description of theory:
The theory that this study will test is 
whether or not semi-democracies, or anocracies, in 
states are more prone to political violence than 
either pure autocracies or pure democracies. 
Anocracy is a type of political regime which 
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employs both democratic and autocratic features. 
Hegre et al. (2001) describe them as “partly open 
yet repressive.”  Fearon and Laiton (2003) describe 
them as “politically weak central governments with 
weak policing or inept and corrupt 
counterinsurgency practices''. The theory that 
anocracies are more prone to violence stems from 
McAdams’ (1982) description of the roles of 
dissident groups, or groups who oppose the political 
group in power, in these countries. In autocratic 
regime, opportunity is too restricted to allow these 
groups to form, and probability for peaceful 
collective action is slim. To contrast, democratic 
regimes are free enough to allow for peaceful, 
collective action. The problem with an anocratic 
regime is that they lie in the middle spectrum in 
terms of dissident groups. They are free enough to 
allow organization of these groups, but are too 
restricted to allow for nonviolent collective action. 
This often results in these groups resorting to 
violence, as it is the only effective means of action. 
Violence from dissident groups eventually results in 
the government attempting to control these groups 
with force. In this study, government-opposing 
dissident groups will act as the independent 
variable. (Vreeland 2003, 401-402). 
The type of violence between groups 
belonging to the same country is known as civil 
war. The American Political Science Review has 
published studies relating to civil war using the 
Polity Index, a 21 point scale of political regime, 
ranging from -10 to 10 (Polity IV). They found that 
civil conflict onset is linked to the middle range of 
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this scale. Civil conflict onset in Egypt will act as 
the dependent variable, with the levels of conflict in 
Egypt directly relating to the effectiveness and 
prevalence of government opposing groups. 
According to this theory, the outcome of 
studying this case would be that Egypt often 
experiences civil conflict. Under Egypt’s anocratic 
regime, extremist and terrorist groups who oppose 
the government will impose unrest and violent 
attacks throughout Egypt. 
Justification:
The case I will be studying is the 
government of Egypt. According to the Polity Data 
Series, Egypt has a score of -4, which is deemed a 
“closed anocracy.” Within the past ten years, the 
Egyptian government has undergone massive shifts 
of power. Corruption and abuse of power by these 
forces have caused uprisings and calls for further 
regime transitions. The lack of policing and overall 
weakness of these regimes allows for easy 
insurgency amongst the Egyptian population and a 
weak central government allows for insurgence to 
be powerful. Egypt employs power using 
authoritarian practices, yet grants its citizens 
enough freedom to effectively oppose them by 
means of revolution. During the Egyptian 
revolution, government-opposing groups could only 
be effective by turning violent, due to strict 
monopoly of power and lack of political rights to 
allow peaceful action. Clashes between security 
forces and protesters often resulted in many injuries 
and deaths. The Egyptian revolution is a most-likely 
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case, as it shows an anocratic regime's inability to 
allow peaceful action among dissident groups.  
Analysis:
In January 2011, President Hosni Mubarak 
was overthrown by the military following mass 
government-opposing protests, which is known as 
the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Furthermore, 
Mubarak shaped his thirty year regime through his 
emergency law, which imposed highly autocratic 
practices. Throughout this emergency law, 
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party secured 
power by means of constitutional manipulation, 
repression, and rigged elections, increasing the 
president’s power and decreasing citizens’ rights. In 
Egypt’s regime at the time, Mubarak could easily 
concentrate power in an executive branch. He had 
the power to elect the prime minister, dissolve the 
legislature, and veto laws (Asser 2011). Local 
councils were elected according to a winner-takes-
all system which guaranteed the NDP’s monopoly 
of power. This acquired monopoly of power 
encouraged corruption and constitutional 
manipulation (Al Jazeera Media Network 2017). 
The protestors, mainly Egyptian youth, opposed 
many dissatisfactions of the Mubarak regime 
regarding his authoritarian-leaning leadership, these 
dissatisfactions being both political and 
socioeconomic. Lack of political and civil rights, 
anger over corruption, inflation, high 
unemployment and inability to find work, and 
police brutality were among the many struggles 
which Egyptians experienced during Mubarak’s 
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reign (McMurry 2013). During these protests, 
Egypt’s capital, Cairo, was described as a “war 
zone”. Violence between security forces and 
protesters resulted in over 800 deaths and 6,000 
injuries, with police failing to disperse the record 
high numbers of protesters. The protesters, as well 
as striking labor unions, demanded the overthrow of 
Mubarak. Mubarak tried to make peace with 
protesters, but his repeated refusal to step down 
resulted in protests rising in intensity. Mubarak was 
finally overthrown on February 11, 2011 by the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, whose role 
in government was to maintain order and stability
(Kannalley 2011). 
After about a year of military rule, the 
Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt 
through a series of elections, having gained support 
from the middle class. The Muslim Brotherhood is 
an opposition group and political organization 
which is based on the belief that Islam is not only a 
religion, but a way of life. They promote ways of 
life given by the Qu’ran rather than a secular 
lifestyle. Islamist leader of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Muhammed Morsi was elected to be president in 
June 2013, making him the first democratically 
elected presdent in Egypt (Byrony and Cullinate 
2013).  During Morsi and the Brotherhood’s reign, 
their push for an Islamic constitution caused an 
outrage amongst secularist Egyptians. During the 
formation of this constitution, Morsi also issued a 
presidential decree which made his decisions more
valuable than judicial review, which caused 
dissatisfaction among the military. In July 2013, 
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Morsi was overthrown by a military coup d’etat, 
intended to reestablish order, led by minister of 
defense General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The coup was 
completed by military soldiers in vehicles gathering 
in Tahrir Square, where protests for Morsi’s 
removal were in process. In a presidential square 
nearby, Islamist supporters chanted, advocating for 
Morsi’s stay. The clash between these Islamist 
supporters and military tanks resulted in many 
deaths as well as over 300 injuries. After the coup, 
Morsi was taken into military custody. The 
Egyptian government declared the Muslim 
Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December 
2013 and suspended the Islamist constitution. Since 
el-Sisi’s election, the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
unable to reestablish any political authority in 
Egypt. (El-Bendery 2013, 1-50)
The reason for Mubarak and Morsi’s 
inability to hold power in Egypt stem from the 
effectiveness of the role of government opposing 
groups in Egypt. An influential group in Egypt 
which acted to oppose the regime during this time is 
the Egyptian military leadership. Their purpose is to 
maintain order and social stability in Egypt, and 
throughout their history they have established a 
strong hold of governmental authority (New York 
Times). One of their primary responsibilities under 
their role of maintaining order and stability is to 
preserve human rights and adhere to the demands of 
the population. An authoritarian government and an 
influential, democracy-preserving group both 
exercising strong power in a country inevitably 
creates tension, given the contradiction of the 
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attempt to oppress citizens and the attempt to 
promote liberty of citizens. The SCAF ruled Egypt 
for a short period of time in 2011, following their 
overthrow Mubarak, but have kept a high amount of 
government authority even when the Muslim 
Brotherhood came to power. During Morsi’s 
election, they preserved a vast number of legislative 
and policing powers. According to conflict analyst 
Anna Louis Strachan, “The military has 
subsequently consolidated its control over almost all 
aspects of the state apparatus in Egypt.” (Strachan 
2017, 3). In both instances of Mubarak and Morsi, 
the military formed coups to counteract the 
oppression of citizens that these presidents had put 
into effect. After mass, violent protests against these 
lack of rights, the SCAF complied with the 
population and recognized the need for political 
rights to be reestablished in Egypt. The government 
alone was not powerful enough to repress these 
coups, since power was split in Egypt (New York 
Times).
Military head Abhel Fattah el-Sisi was 
elected president in June of 2014, with more than 
96% of the population’s vote, and is still in power 
currently. During el-Sisi’s presidency, he expressed 
his concern for the need for a Unified Arab Force as 
an attempt to decrease violence against Egyptian 
minorities from jihadist forces. el-Sisi gained 
support and was elected for a second term in 2018, 
with over 97% of the vote, and seemed to bring a 
new “era of hope” for Egypt. However, throughout 
his presidency el-Sisi shaped his regime to be 
increasingly autocratic. He has given an interior 
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ministry in Egypt authority to arrest and torture 
dissident groups in order to establish political 
authority. Supporters of this regime argue that 
coercion of this nature is the only effective way of 
maintaining order and structure throughout Egypt. 
However, the el-Sisi regime has been ineffective in 
creating a strong hold of its citizens, with protests 
being so high in numbers that police forces have 
trouble dispersing them, furthering political 
violence between protestors and the regime. (Bayles 
2019).
Lessons learned:
In sum, it has been proven that anocracies 
are especially prone to political violence due to the 
opportunities available for government-opposing 
dissident groups. The theory that semi-democracies 
grant dissident groups enough freedom for 
collective action, but not enough freedom to allow 
protests to be peaceful holds true while studying the 
case of Egypt throughout the course of its regime 
changes. A state is unable to remain peaceful if its 
monopoly of power is based on authoritarian 
principles, yet its citizens are given enough liberty 
to form groups that oppose this monopoly of power. 
Liberty without full democracy creates political 
violence between government and citizens. Thus, a 
state would be able to decrease civil conflict by 
increasing democratization. If Egypt were to 
democratize, giving its citizens more political rights 
and civil liberties, Egyptians would feel less 
oppressed by the regime and anti-government 
protests would decrease. Democratization would 
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also provide economic benefits to Egypt, as 
democratization is linked with high human capital 
and lower inflation. A more stable economy would 
give Egyptians better standards of living by 
increasing employment levels. Lack of rights as 
well as economic instability constitute the 
prominent reasons of the Egyptian Revolution of 
2011, furthering establishing the notion of 
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